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Abstract
We empirically analyse the impact of public employment and public wages shocks on 
private labour market outcomes by examining whether policies operate differently in periods 
of economic slack than in normal times. We use local projection methods and focus on the 
Spanish and euro area aggregate cases. We fi nd that the degree of unemployment slack 
is key for determining: (i) whether public employment crowds out private employment, and 
(ii) the degree and extent of the infl uence of public wages on the private sector. In addition, 
we fi nd that at times of economic distress, public wage adjustment has lower output costs 
than public employment cuts for the Spanish case, while the opposite occurs at the euro 
area level. We conjecture that differences in the degree of wage rigidities and the size of the 
unemployment pool may rationalise our fi ndings.
Keywords: public employment, wages, unemployment, fi scal policies.
JEL classifi cation: E62, E65, H6, C3, C82.
Resumen
Este trabajo analiza el impacto del empleo y de los salarios públicos sobre el mercado 
de trabajo. En particular, analizamos si los mecanismos de transmisión desde el sector 
público al sector privado funcionan de manera diferente según la economía se encuentre en 
recesión (elevada tasa de paro) o en expansión. Explotamos datos tanto de España como 
de la zona del euro en su conjunto, y utilizamos el método de proyecciones locales [Jordà 
(2005)]. Los resultados indican que la situación de la tasa de paro es clave para determinar: 
i) si el empleo público desplaza al empleo privado, y ii) la magnitud de la infl uencia de los 
salarios públicos en el sector privado. Además, observamos que, en momentos de crisis 
económica, el ajuste salarial es menos costoso en términos de PIB que una reducción del 
empleo público para el caso español, mientras que lo contrario sucede en el área del euro. 
Conjeturamos que las diferencias en el grado de rigidez de los salarios y la tasa de paro 
pueden racionalizar estos hallazgos.
Palabras clave: empleo público, salarios, desempleo, política fi scal.
Códigos JEL: E62, E65, H6, C3, C82.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we provide empirical evidence on the impact of public employment and public
wages’ policies on private labour market outcomes and GDP during recessions. This is to us
a relevant question given the prominent role taken by public wage bill consolidation policies
during the most recent crisis.1 More specifically our research questions are the following: (i)
Is the impact of a public employment shock on private employment different depending on
the degree of economic slack?; (ii) Is the degree and extent of public wage influence on the
private sector state-contingent?; (iii) do public employment and public wages have different
impacts on GDP?
We study the cases of Spain and the euro area taken as a whole (euro area aggregate),
to cover two cases with significantly different levels of unemployment and degrees of fis-
cal stress during the most recent crisis. To allow for non-trivial non-linearities, we set up
state-dependent models using Jorda`’s (2005) local projection method. This method offers
a straightforward solution to some problems that arise in computing impulse responses in
regime-switching models, as discussed for example by Ramey and Zubairy (2013).
The potential state-contingency of public employment and wages can be illustrated with
a simple, though suggestive chart. In Figure 1 we show the unconditional correlation line
between public and private sector employment and wages for a number of euro area countries
over the period 1970-2012.2 The first row of the chart displays the scatter plots for the whole
sample: in both cases (employment and wages) an overall positive correlation is observed.
In the second and third rows we show separately the unconditional correlations for “good”
and “bad” times, i.e. in above-the-average real GDP growth periods and below-the-average
growth periods. Interestingly, while the results drawn from the whole sample scatter plot for
the correlation between public and private wages are similar to those in the cases of high- and
low-growth periods taken separately, this is not the case, at least, for public employment.
1See for instance Pe´rez et al. (2015.)
2Countries included in the scatter plot are: Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland, i.e. the original (i.e. since 1999 or 2001) euro area countries
with the exception of Luxembourg (not included due to data shortages). Data are taken from European
Commission’s AMECO database.
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Indeed, in bad times a positive correlation is observed, while in good times this correlation
turns out to be negative.
Our analysis is rooted in three related strands of the literature. First, a fast expanding
group of works that explores whether estimates of government spending vary depending
on whether the economy is in recession or in expansion, and that has provided abundant
pieces of evidence showing that indeed this is generally the case.3 Within this literature
there is very limited empirical evidence on the role of labour market channels in determining
the state-contingency of public spending multipliers,4 while a recent theoretical literature
highlights their importance.5 A second strand of the literature explores the optimal design
of fiscal consolidations and finds that when the public wage bill is used as a policy instrument
the probability of the consolidation being successful increases. The later fact is related to
the particular transmission channels through which public employment and wages’ policies
operate, namely by affecting private wages and thus private investment and competitiveness.6
In this respect, the final branch of the literature related to our paper is the one on the public-
private employment and wages nexus, that has stressed, on the one hand, the potential
crowding-out of private employment by public employment7 and, on the other hand, the
influence (signalling/causality effects) of public wages over private sector wages.8
Our main findings are the following. First, we find that a public employment shock
crowds-out private employment in periods of normal economic slack, while the opposite
happens in periods of high-unemployment, at least in the short-run. While the literature
3See for example Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Ramey and Zubairy (2013), Herna´ndez de Cos
and Moral-Benito (2015), and the references quoted therein.
4Most of the empirical work on this issue estimates standard SVAR or similar models in which public
and private sector labour market variables are allowed to interact (see for instance Pappa, 2009; Linnemann
2009; Lamo et al., 2012)
5See for instance Michaillat (2014) or Betti and Coudert (2015).
6See for instance Alesina et al. (2002), Linneman (2009). On related grounds see Bermperoglou et al.
(2013).
7For different theoretical channels and empirical evidence see for example Algan et al. (2002), Forni and
Giordano (2003), Ardagna (2007), Pappa (2009), Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba et al. (2012), Malley and Moutos
(2001), Behar and Mok, (2013) or Lamo et al. (2013), and the references quoted therein.
8See for instance Lindquist and Vilhelmsson (2006), Pe´rez and Sanchez-Fuentes (2011), Lamo et al.
(2012), Zeilstra and Elbourne (2013) or Afonso and Gomes (2014).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 9 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1605
tends to find that an increase in public employment crowds-out private employment, at least
in the medium-term, our findings provide empirical support to some recent theoretical papers
(see Michaillat, 2014) that argue that crowding-out is more a “good times” issue.9 Second,
the role of economic slack is less pronounced in determining the effect of public wages on
private wages. While the effect is positive in both cases for the Euro Area (larger in periods
of high unemployment), it is slightly negative, short-lived and only marginally significant for
Spain. Third, in periods of economic slack, the contractionary effects of employment cuts
appear more damaging for the economy than wage cuts, as found by Bermperoglou et al.
(2013).10
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explain the data used in the
study and the methodological approach. In turn, in Section 3 we present the main results of
the paper. Finally, in Section 4 we provide some conclusions.
2 Data and empirical methodology
2.1 The data
We take the euro area aggregate figures for the period 1980Q1-2012Q4 from ECB’s Area
Wide Model Database.11 The fiscal block of the latter database is described in Paredes et
al. (2014). In the case of Spain, we take the time series for macroeconomic aggregates from
Bank of Spain’s MTBE database, and fiscal data from de Castro et al. (2014). In this case
our dataset covers the period 1986Q1 to 2012Q4.
9In this type of papers increasing public employment stimulates labour demand, which in turn increases
tightness and therefore crowds-out private employment, while when labour demand is depressed and unem-
ployment is high, the increase in tightness and resulting crowding-out are small.
10Within the fiscal multipliers literature, Bermperoglou et al. (2013) find in a SVAR framework that
cuts in the wage bill component identified as government vacancy cuts generate the largest output losses
and achieve the smallest deficit reductions, regardless of the sample and the country (US, Canada, Japan,
the UK), and significant unemployment losses in the US and the UK, while wage cuts have, if anything,
insignificant expansionary effects to achieve the largest deficit reductions.
11See Fagan et al. (2005) and Gumiel (2012). This database is disseminated regularly through the official
AWM site with the Euro Area Business Cycle Network (www.eabcn.org\data\awm\index.htm).
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Figure 1: Private versus public employment and wages in the euro area (1970-2012).
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We compute compensation per employee using employee compensation and employment
data. Compensation of private sector employees is defined as total economy employee com-
pensation minus the compensation of government employees. Compensation per private em-
ployee is defined as private employee compensation divided by the number of private sector
employees (i.e. total employment minus government employment minus self-employment).
Compensation per employee, deflated by the private consumption deflator, will be our con-
cept of “wage per employee”. This is the standard approach of the literature analyzing
aggregate public and private wages.12
2.2 Methodology
The main motivation of the Local projections (LPs) approach (Jorda´, 2005) was to develop a
method to reduce the dependence of the IRF estimates on the specification of the data gener-
ating process, that is, LPs are more robust to model misspecification than other alternative
methods, in particular, Smooth Transition Vector Autoregression models (STVAR hence-
forth). Moreover, LPs are easy to implement, and they can be easily adapted to non-linear
specifications. In fact, LPs are becoming very popular in the literature for these reasons.13
Intuitively, LPs are based on a sequence of linear projections of the variable of interest on
the current information set. The slope parameters of such projections combined with any
estimate of the structural impact multiplier matrix (e.g. the Cholesky decomposition) di-
rectly produce the IRFs of interest. Provided the data generating process is stationary and
linear, IRFs based on LPs are asymptotically equivalent to those based on the standard
VAR alternative. However, in contrast to standard VARs, LPs do not require any non-linear
transformation of the slope parameters and their estimation involves much less parameters,
which prove specially useful in non-linear settings.14
To begin with, we review how to introduce LPs in a linear specification for the sake of
simplicity, and then we move to the description of the LP method to a nonlinear framework.
12See for instance Lamo et al. (2012) and the references quoted therein.
13See for instance Ramey and Zubairy (2013), that consider this approach to estimate state-dependent
multipliers of government spending.
14The LPs method is not without drawbacks, however. It might present higher variances (efficiency losses)
if the data generating process is well approximated by a VAR.
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Figure 2: Regime indicators: weights on the high unemployment regime.
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We start from a baseline linear VAR specification similar to the one traditionally used in the
literature on this topic. Regarding employment, this baseline VAR contains five variables,
namely, public employment (N g), private employment (Npr), real GDP (GDP ), the real
interest rate (R), and real total government revenues (T ). Macroeconomic fluctuations are
accounted for by the inclusion of output and real interest rate; for instance, aggregate shocks
other than fiscal shocks might simultaneously affect private and public employment so these
two variables aim to control for this potential source of endogeneity. In addition, the variable
on government revenues is included to account for the indirect effect that private activity
(e.g. employment) might have on public employment through increases in the amount of
funds available to the government. Formally, the reduced-form VAR is:
Xt = B1Xt−1 + ...+BpXt−p + t (1)
whereXt = (N
g
t , N
pr
t , GDPt, Rt, Tt)
′, B1, ..., Bp are coefficient matrices and t is a 5−dimensional
i.i.d. white noise; E(t) = 0, E(t
′
t) = Σ with Σ being a non-singular and positive definite
matrix.15 In the case of wages, the vector Xt includes public wages (W
g), private wages
(W pr), productivity (PROD), the real interest rate (R), and real total government revenues
(T ). The rationale for this specification is essentially the same as that of the employment
VAR. Moreover, one can write in structural form the reduced-form VAR in equation (1) as:
A0Xt = A1Xt + ....+ ApXt−p + ηt (2)
where ηt are the structural shocks and E(ηtη
′
t) = Ση = I5 without loss of generality. Following
Linnemann (2009), we include all variables in logarithms of their levels, except the real
interest rate, which is entered as the logarithm of one plus the real rate. Then, we formally
consider a sequence of H forward projections for h = 1, ..., H as follows:
NPrt+h = α
h + βh1Xt + ...+ β
h
pXt−p+1 + ut+h (3)
where the 5× 1 vector Xt is defined above.16 By construction, βh1 can be interpreted as the
response of NPrt+h to a reduced-form disturbance in t:
15For expository purposes, we abstract from deterministic regressors, although we allow for lags of each
endogenous variable, a time trend, and a constant throughout the paper.
16Moreover, p is the lag length of each projection. In practical terms, note that one cannot forecast further
than the sample size available for estimation, which is reduced as p and H increase.
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βh1 = E(N
Pr
t+h|t = 1;Xt, ..., Xt−p)− E(NPrt+h|t = 0;Xt, ..., Xt−p) (4)
where t is the reduced form shock in (1). Therefore, it is easy to estimate the structural
response at horizon h of private employment (wages) to a public employment (wages) shock
as follows:
Θh = β
h
1dNg (5)
where dNg is the first column of the impact matrix A
−1
0 defined in (2). Analogously, we
could construct IRFs based on local projections (i.e. LPIRFs henceforth) for shocks in other
variables by simply considering alternative columns of the impact matrix.
In practice, we simply need to obtain the Aˆ−10 matrix by using standard VAR methods.
We rely on a Cholesky identification strategy with the public employment/wage variable
ordered first, which is standard in the linear literature.17 The remaining variables enter in
the same order as they are listed in the vector Xt above. In practice, this identification
strategy implies that A−10 is a lower triangular matrix satisfying A
−1
0 (A
−1
0 )
′ = Σ.18 It is
based on the assumption that fiscal policy actions are independent of economic activity (e.g.
private employment/wages, output) within the current quarter. As long as fiscal authorities
require some planning and preparations to conduct policy, it seems reasonable to assume
that public employment/wages do not react to either private employment/wages or GDP
within the current quarter.
We estimate a sequence of least-squares regressions in (3) for each horizon h. Turning to
inference, we use the Newey-West correction for our standard errors to account for the serial
correlation in the error terms induced by the successive leading of the dependent variable;
17This identification strategy is also standard in the multipliers literature (see e.g. Blanchard and Per-
otti, 2002; Gali et al., 2007) and in the public employment literature. Malley and Moutos (1996) assume
that public employment is weakly exogenous in a VEC-ECM model including public employment, private
employment and the stock of capital. Algan et al. (2002) consider a panel approach and instrument public
employment with its own lags assuming lack of contemporaneous correlation between public employment
and shocks to private employment. Finally, Linnemann (2009) considers a linear VAR model adopting the
same ordering as the one we adopt here.
18Note that t = A
−1
0 ηt so that E(t
′
t) = Σ = A
−1
0 Ση(A
−1
0 )
′.
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Jorda´ (2009) and Kilian and Kim (2009) provide an in-depth analysis of confidence intervals
in the LPs framework.
It is straightforward to extend the LPs method to a nonlinear framework. Let us define
a dummy variable It that indicates the state of the economy at period t taking the value 1
if the slack is high (high unemployment) and 0 when the slack is low (low unemployment).
Armed with the It indicator of the state of the economy, we can simply estimate a set of
regressions for each horizon h:
NPrt+h = It
{
αh,HS + βh,HS1 Xt + ...+ β
h,HS
p Xt−p+1
}
(6)
+ (1− It)
{
αh,LS + βh,LS1 Xt + ...+ β
h,LS
p Xt−p+1
}
+ ut+h
Importantly, we allow the slope coefficients to vary according to whether the slack of the
economy is high (HS) or when the slack is low (LS) as defined by the It indicator. Thus,
we are able to construct a LPIRF for recessions as a sequence of ΘHSh = β
h,HS
1 dNg , and a
different LPIRF for expansions by computing ΘLSh . Analogously, we can also estimate LPs
and the corresponding LPIRFs to a public employment (or wages) shock for any variable of
interest by simply substituting the dependent variable in equation (6). In addition to private
employment (NPrt+h), we also explore the responses of public employment and wages, private
wages, GDP, productivity, interest rates, and tax revenues.
Crucially, note that we estimate our LPIRFs by means of single OLS regressions, thus,
the number of parameters to be estimated to obtain each LPIRF is drastically reduced.
This is in sharp contrast with the STVAR approach, where one needs to estimate the full
set of parameters in the highly parametrized nonlinear VAR. Moreover, as pointed out by
Koop et al. (1996), estimation of IRFs in nonlinear models poses a challenge. In contrast
to linear models, the response may depend on the magnitude of the shock as well as on the
history of previous shocks. By means of the LP method, we estimate separate regressions
for each horizon h; thus, the estimated parameters (βh,HS1 , β
h,LS
1 ) and the resulting LPIRFs
depend on the average behavior of the economy in the historical sample between t and t+h.
Intuitively, the parameter estimates on the right-hand-side variables in (6) take into account
the average tendency of the economy to evolve between states (e.g. low slack vs. high slack).
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2.3 Definition of the economic slack state
We focus on the high unemployment and low unemployment states as the periods of high
and low slack of the economy, respectively. This is guided by the prescriptions of the theory,
as discussed above. labour market channels are expected to operated differently when the
unemployment rate is high than when it is low, and this is likely to provide more insights
than the standard recession/expansion distinction. Nevertheless, for the sake of robustness,
we have run our empirical applications with a more standard measure of slack, namely real
GDP, and the results are qualitatively similar to the ones we will report based on the measure
of high/low unemployment, that is closer to the theoretical literature of reference.19
As to the particular way of computing the different states, we define an economy to be
in a slack state (I = 1) when the unemployment rate is above its sample average, namely,
13.8% in the case of Spain, and 9% in the case of the euro area. This is a simple, transparent
and standard approach. Shaded regions in Figure 2 correspond to the periods of slack (i.e.,
It = 1) identified for Spain and the euro area following this rule. In any case, to check
for the potential influence of our choice for the subsequent empirical results, we have also
estimated threshold values in the framework of STVAR models. The key intuition of the
STVAR methodology is to define a set of probabilities for each state of the economy (e.g.
low slack versus high slack) and then estimate state-specific VAR coefficients and variance-
covariance matrices in order to estimate IRFs and multipliers that depend on the state of
the economy. We run the models to identify the states of the economy. Nevertheless, in
addition, we use this methodology as a sensitivity test for our benchmark Local Projections
approach. As regards the first issue, estimated states are identical to the ones identified with
sample averages. As regards the second issue, qualitative results are in line with the one we
will show later.20
19The results are available from the authors upon request.
20Results are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 3: Response of private employment to a public employment shock.
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Formally, the STVAR model is:
X†t = C + (1− F (zt−1))ΦS1X†t−1 + F (zt−1)ΦS2X†t−1 + et (7)
et ∼ iid(0,Ωt)
Ωt = ΩS1(1− F (zt−1)) + ΩS2F (zt−1)
F (zt) =
exp(−γzt)
(1 + exp(−γzt)) , γ > 0
where the sub-indices S1 and S2 refer to the states of the economy. The vector X
†
t contains
the variables included in the STVAR, which is only a subset of those included in the original
vector Xt in equation (1). The number of variables to be included in X
†
t is restricted
because the sample size available for estimation does not yield enough degrees of freedom
to robustly estimate the high number of coefficients of the model (this is a crucial concern
of the STVAR approach, not only restricted to our particular empirical application). In
particular, our exercise is based on X†t = (N
g
t , N
pr
t , GDPt)
′. Matrices ΦS1 , ΦS2 , ΩS1 , and
ΩS2 contain the coefficients of the lag polynomials and the variance-covariance matrices of
the shocks in the different regimes.21 Finally, zt is an indicator of the state of the economy
in quarter t, normalised to have zero mean and unit variance. The weights assigned to
each regime vary between 0 and 1 according to the weighting function F (·). Note also that
21Note that equation (7) contains one single lag to avoid notational clutter; however, we estimate the
model considering a maximum of three lags
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the index z is dated at t − 1 to avoid contemporaneous feedbacks from policy actions to
the state of the economy. Intuitively, F (zt) can be interpreted as the probability of being
in a high unemployment state when zt is the unemployment rate. The estimated weights
(probabilities) for the high-unemployment regimes, for the cases Spain and the euro area
aggregate, respectively, unveil the same episodes characterised in Figure 2.
3 Results
3.1 Main results
We discuss in this Section simulations to provide answers to the three questions posed in
the Introduction: (i) Is the impact of a public employment shock on private employment
different depending on the degree of economic slack?; (ii) Is the degree and extent of public
wage influence on the private sector state-contingent?; (iii) As regards the choice of public
employment and public wages as a fiscal consolidation instrument, which is the one to be
preferred from the point of view of their GDP effects?
As regards the first question, in Figure 3 we show the response of private employment to
a public employment shock (an unexpected increase in public employment). The following
findings can be highlighted. First, we find crowding-out of private employment by public
employment in times of low unemployment, both in cases of the euro area aggregate and
Spain. When unemployment slack is low the estimated response of private employment are
statistically significant and negative even after eight quarters in the case of Spain: a 1 person
increase in public employment leads after eight quarters to a fall of private employment of
0.75 persons over that period (see Panel B of Table 1). In the case of the euro area aggregate,
in turn, the cumulative (negative) effect is larger in magnitude but shorter-lived, as it losses
statistical significance after four quarters, with a cumulative reduction of 1.74 workers after
four quarters (see Panel A of Table 1). By contrast, when unemployment is high (high
slack in the economy) we find evidence in support of crowding-in of public employment over
private employment both in the case of Spain and the euro area aggregate. Indeed, for
the euro area aggregate, a 1 person increase in public employment, when unemployment is
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Figure 4: Response of private sector wages to a public wage shock.
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high, leads after four quarters to an increase of private employment of 1.52 persons, while
in the case of Spain it leads to an increase of 0.30 persons after four quarters and 0.88
persons after eight quarters. Interestingly, for the euro area after the first year the response
of private employment turns into negative territory, i.e. the crowding-in result is short-lived
and turns into crowding-out as of the second year. These results reinforce the most recent
theoretical literature that highlights the crucial role of unemployment slack to determine the
crowding-out/-in of public employment over private sector employment. As discussed above,
our empirical results can be rationalised by models like the one in Michaillat (2014). In the
later model, the crowding-out effect is based on a lower pool of unemployed searching for a
job in the private sector following the rise in public vacancies. When the pool of searchers
is high at the steady-state, this crowding-out effect is then lower.
As regards the issue of the influence of public wages on private sector wages, we present
in Figure 4 the state-contingent response of private wages to a public wages’ shock (an
unexpected increase in government wages). Looking first at the Euro area aggregate, when
the unemployment rate is high an increase in public sector wages leads to an increase in
private sector wages; in cumulative terms, the effect of a 1% positive shock increases private
wages by 0.87% after four quarters, and by 2.45% in cumulative terms after eight quarters.
In times of low unemployment, the positive impact is also present and similar in magnitude.
This evidence for the euro area sample is in line with the prescription of extant theories.
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Wages in the public and private sectors move in the same direction, with changes depending
on the state of the economy being just a matter of the size of the impact of the public
wage shock. Turning now to the Spanish case, an economy that has presented historically
a significant degree of downward real wage rigidity, the response of private wages is not
statistically significant, or mildly, short-lived negative, during periods of high unemployment,
i.e. when public wage cuts are more likely due to the simultaneous occurrence of high slack
and fiscal stress episodes. In good times (low unemployment rate), an unexpected increase
in public wages presents the potential of pushing down private sector wages, probably as
a result of its negative impact on output, as we discuss below. The theoretical literature
provide less guidance as regards the operation of the wage channel in periods of low/high
unemployment slack. For example, in the paper mentioned above by Michaillat (2014), the
real wage law of motion is assumed as exogenous. In more standard models without this
distinction (see e.g. Afonso and Gomes, 2014) a positive reaction of private wages to a
public wage shock can be rationalised at least by the operation of two channels. First, the
public wage shock increases the value to be unemployed. Second, a rise in the marginal
productivity of labour creates upward pressures on private real wages. Nevertheless, Betti
and Coudert (2015) show in a similar framework that a rise in private wages following a
rise in public wages depends strongly on the assumptions made about how the “shock” is
financed. In particular, in case of a debt-based public wage expansion, their model produces
a clear decrease in private wages.
Finally, regarding the role of public employment versus public wages as a fiscal consol-
idation instruments, in Figure 5 we show the response of real GDP to shocks (unexpected
increases) in these two fiscal instruments, conditional on the selected variables of control.
We present these estimates in order to better link our work to the literature on the macroe-
conomic impact of fiscal shocks, that has mainly focused on the real GDP impact of such
shocks. In periods of hight unemployment, an increase in public employment (first row of
charts of the Figure) leads to an increase in GDP for both the euro area aggregate and Spain,
with multipliers after four quarters of 0.6 and a mild 0.1, respectively (see next Section for
detailed numbers). After eight quarters the multiplier for Spain remains broadly at 0,1, while
for the euro area taken as a whole the positive impact is shorter-lived, as it loses significance,
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Figure 5: Response of real GDP to public employment and wages’ shocks.
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reflecting some negative effect on GDP of the shock during the second year. After 12 quar-
ters, in fact, the cumulative multiplier turns negative to reach -1.6. These results are in line
with the cumulative and dynamic responses discussed above for private employment. With
respect to output multipliers in times of low unemployment, the crowding-out of private
employment by public employment has a parallel in the response of GDP in both samples,
with a larger but less significant reaction in the euro area case. Indeed, in the latter case, the
cumulative multiplier after four quarters is -0.6, to reach -1.1 after 12 quarters. For Spain
the responses are estimated with more precision, being significant at the 1% level, but are
quantitatively weaker (-0.1 after four quarters, staying at a similar level in cumulative terms
after 12 quarters). In the case of wages, the impact of a (positive) public wages’ shock on
GDP (second row of charts of the Figure) in times of high unemployment is positive for the
euro area aggregate but negative for Spain, i.e. in this latter case, an unexpected increase in
public wages cause a fall in output and private wages. As regards the impact of the public
wages shock during good times, the response of GDP is not significant for both Spain and
the euro area.
3.2 Additional results
Table 1 reports additional results on the impact of public employment shocks for the euro
area aggregate and Spain. We show cumulative multipliers on impact, and after 4, 8, and
12 quarters. We present the responses of public and private employment, real GDP, un-
employment and public and private sector wages, in all cases using the local projections
methodology, as described above.
Results for the euro area are displayed in Panel A of Table 1. In the high-unemployment
case a public employment (positive) shock only has a limited effect on subsequent public
employment dynamics (first panel of the Table), with no on-impact effect, but that turns to
0.3% after 8 quarters. The impact on private employment (second panel of the Table), as
described above, is positive and significant up to 4 quarters, with the multiplier reaching 1.5,
before turning to the negative territory (-4 after three years). The public-private employment
dynamics are consistent with the effects on the unemployment rate (fourth panel) that gets
reduced in the first year (by 1.4% as a reaction to the 1% shock in public employment),
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Table 1: Responses to a public employment shock.
A. Euro Area B. Spain
1. RESPONSE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
Regime Impact 4q 8q 12q Regime Impact 4q 8q 12q
High U 0.01 0.12 * 0.26 *** 0.01 High U 0.00 0.01 0.02 ** 0.03 ***
Low U -0.01 0.03 0.09 -0.12 Low U 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
2. RESPONSE OF PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
Regime Impact 4q 8q 12q Regime Impact 4q 8q 12q
High U 0.24 1.52 *** 1.04 -3.99 ** High U 0.00 0.30 ** 0.88 *** 0.78 ***
Low U -0.12 -1.74 ** -2.83 ** -3.40 * Low U -0.03 -0.38 *** -0.75 *** -0.66 ***
3. RESPONSE OF REAL GDP
Regime Impact 4q 8q 12q Regime Impact 4q 8q 12q
High U 0.09 ** 0.60 *** 0.01 -1.56 *** High U 0.01 ** 0.05 *** 0.12 *** 0.13 ***
Low U 0.02 -0.63 * -0.57 -1.08 * Low U -0.01 *** -0.05 *** -0.08 *** -0.06 **
4. RESPONSE OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
Regime Impact 4q 8q 12q Regime Impact 4q 8q 12q
High U -0.35 * -1.42 ** -0.52 6.18 *** High U -0.01 -0.18 ** -0.11 0.63 **
Low U -0.09 1.06 0.50 1.49 Low U 0.02 0.14 *** 0.12 * -0.41 **
5. RESPONSE OF PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES
Regime Impact 4q 8q 12q Regime Impact 4q 8q 12q
High U 0.03 0.83 *** 1.26 *** 1.48 *** High U 0.00 0.02 0.11 *** 0.30 ***
Low U -0.15 ** -0.96 *** -2.19 *** -3.34 *** Low U 0.01 * -0.01 -0.03 -0.03
6. RESPONSE OF PRIVATE SECTOR WAGES
Regime Impact 4q 8q 12q Regime Impact 4q 8q 12q
High U -0.14 *** -0.56 *** -0.99 *** -2.22 *** High U 0.00 0.03 ** 0.08 *** 0.18 ***
Low U 0.02 0.33 0.68 * 0.73 * Low U 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03
a Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
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but that turns out to increase after 12 quarters (6% cumulative increase). The employment
behaviour presents a parallel behaviour to that of GDP, that presents a 0.6 multiplier after
4 quarters, that turns into -1.6 after 12 quarters. As regards wages, the public employment
shock in “bad times” leads to an increase in public wages and a reduction in private sector
wages.
In turn, in the low unemployment state, the public employment expansion increases un-
employment. Nevertheless, the response is not statistically significant, despite the strong
decrease in private employment caused by the public employment expansion (the crowding-
out effect described in the previous Section) and the null additional increase in public em-
ployment in response to the shock. In this case, the effect on real GDP is negative, while
the sign of the effect on wages is the opposite as in the high-unemployment case: public
wages get reduced (-0.15 on impact, -3.3 after 12 quarters), while private wages increase
mildly after the second year. In good times, a Ricardian behaviour of consumers is more
likely to be observed. Accordingly, the public employment shock causes a negative wealth
effect that in standard models (see Finn, 1996; Cavallo, 2005) increases private wages and
reduces hours worked in the private sector. Under the bargaining channel,22 an increase in
public employment makes it marginally more attractive (or less unattractive) to become un-
employed, since unemployed people stand the chance to obtain a government job. Through
this channel, an increase in public employment puts upward pressure on private wages and
downward pressure on private employment, explaining crowding out.
Turning to the case of Spain (Panel B of Table 1), most of the conclusions for the euro
area discussed above remain true in the Spanish case. However, it is worth highlighting that
the multipliers are generally smaller than in the EU case. For instance, while the eight-
quarter multiplier of public wages is 1.26 in the euro area, it is only 0.11 in the case of Spain.
Finally, the reaction of private wages differs with respect to the euro area: the Ricardian
increase of private wages takes place in periods of high unemployment, when uncertainty is
higher.
22See for instance Caponi and Reicher (2015), Afonso and Gomes (2014).
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4 Conclusions
Some policy lessons can be drawn from this study, that includes descriptive evidence, a deep
description of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature, and some empirical exercises.
First, we find evidence that in expansions public employment may crowd-out private
employment. In recessions, though, an unexpected increase in public employment leads to
higher private employment, even though the positive effect is relatively short-lived, turning
negative after 4-6 quarters.
Second, on the wage side, we validate and extend the by now standard result that public
wages may lead private sector wages in the Euro Area; indeed, we read the fact that the
mechanism operates in recessions as a signal that policies of public wage restraint may set
in motion a labour market adjustment that otherwise would have taken longer and would
have been, consequently more costly for the economy as a whole.
Third, along these lines, also in order to assess the response of GDP to public employ-
ment and wages’ shocks we have learnt that it is necessary to take on board the state of
the economy. Our results help to understand and qualify some evidence presented in the
literature. For example Bermperoglou, Pappa and Vella (2013) find that cuts in the wage
bill component identified as government employment cuts generate output losses regardless
of the sample and the country analysed, while wage cuts in contrast have, if anything, in-
significant expansionary effects and achieve the largest public deficit reductions according
to these authors. As regards public employment, the latter results are broadly valid in our
two case studies (Spain and the euro area as a whole) in “bad times” (high unemployment,
economic recession), while in times of low unemployment an increase in public employment
would reduce GDP. As regards public wages, our results are not that clear-cut. Nevertheless,
in this case the relevant distinction does not seem to be the good times vs bad times one,
but rather the specific features of the Spanish economy versus the euro area economy as a
whole. Differences would have to be traced most likely to specific features of labour markets
in both cases.
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